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Abstract: The Government of Montenegro is preparing an electricity tariff reform due to 
recent developments in the national and regional electricity markets. Electricity tariffs for 
residential consumers in Montenegro are likely to gradually increase by anywhere from 40 to 
over 100 percent. This significant price rise will impose a heavy burden on the poor 
households and it may adversely affect the environment. In an ex-ante investigation of the 
welfare impact of this price increase on households in Montenegro, we show that the 
anticipated price increase will result in a very significant increase in households’ energy 
expenditures. A simulation of alternative policy measures analyzes the impact of different 
tariff levels and structures on the poor and vulnerable households in particular. Higher 
electricity prices could also significantly increase the proportion of households using 
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Countries with former centrally planned economies in Europe and Central Asia are in the 
process of implementing structural reforms in the energy sector. In the past, electricity tariffs 
were very low in these countries, inducing inefficient electricity consumption. Furthermore, 
electricity tariffs did not cover the operation costs, leading to large subsidies to utility 
companies and thus imposing a heavy fiscal burden on the budget. In the 1990s governments 
in Europe and Central Asia started to implement market reforms, including restructuring 
energy utility companies, liberalizing energy markets, and raising energy prices to the cost 
recovery level. The main objective of these reforms was to reduce fiscal subsidies, improve 
operational efficiency of the utility companies and raise end-user energy efficiency. 
However, the substantial increase in energy prices in the region has had an adverse impact on 
poverty and the environment when pricing reforms were not combined with measures to 
mitigate the losses from a price increase on the poor households.    
 
Contrary to most other transition economies, where energy intensity declined or remained 
stable in the 1990s, in Montenegro energy intensity per unit of GDP increased by as much as 
60 percent. This significant increase was a result of low energy prices, a declining GDP level, 
and a lack of financing to maintain and upgrade energy infrastructure.
1 In order to improve 
energy efficiency and the financial situation in the energy sector the Government of 
Montenegro began implementing energy sector reforms, which include increases in 
electricity tariffs. 
 
Further price increases are now under consideration due to recent developments in the 
regional electricity market. Along with the other countries in South East Europe, Montenegro 
recently signed a regional energy treaty, which commits the signatory countries to liberalize 
the non-residential energy market by January 1
st 2008.
2  This treaty includes a set of measures 
intended to support the development of a regional electricity market, such as raising 
electricity tariffs to the cost-recovery level, enforcing payments discipline, restructuring 
energy companies, establishing an independent energy regulator, revising tariff 
methodologies, and putting in place social safety nets to offset the adverse impact of tariff 
increases on vulnerable households. In the next five years these reforms are expected to lead 
to a significant electricity price increase in the signatory countries.
3 This paper is an ex-ante 
analysis of the welfare impact of this price increase on households in Montenegro. 
 
There is some debate about the appropriate cost recovery level that should be used as a 
benchmark in setting electricity tariff levels in Montenegro.  By some estimates, electricity is 
no longer subsidized in Montenegro and the average residential tariff of 4.85 c€/kWh, 
including taxes, has reached the current short-run cost-recovery price level.
4 The long-run 
cost recovery level for the region is estimated around 7.0 c€/kWh and it includes the 
provision for investments in maintenance and upgrading of the infrastructure (Figure 1).
5 
                                                 
1 See “Serbia and Montenegro. A Country Environmental Analysis.” The World Bank. Washington D.C. (2003). 
2 Participating countries in the development of the power market in South East Europe under this treaty include 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, and Romania. Turkey is also expected to sign the treaty at later date. 
3 See Kennedy, David (2006), “World Bank Framework for Development of a Power Market in South East 
Europe.” 
4 Personal communication with David Kennedy (World Bank). Information about the average residential tariff 
was provided by EPCG (Elektroprivreda Crne Gore), the Electric Company of Montenegro. 
5 In the absence of specific data regarding the cost recovery price level for Montenegro and how much that is 
likely to vary given alternative new investment choices, we rely on regional estimates of cost recovery prices   2
However, the cost recovery level in Montenegro could be higher than the regional average, 
for example, if the country faces higher generation costs. The electric utility company in 
Montenegro (EPCG) is requesting the Regulatory Agency to approve an increase of the 
average residential electricity tariff to 10.7 c€/kWh and it has argued that an increase of this 
magnitude would be necessary to cover the rising labor costs and local communal taxes. This 
paper does not aim to resolve the debate of what is the appropriate electricity tariff level and 
argue in favor of a particular estimate of the cost-recovery level. Instead, we focus on an 
illustration of the anticipated poverty and environmental effects in several policy scenarios.  
 
The Government of Montenegro faces an important policy dilemma. Residential electricity 
tariffs could more than double over the next four years if the regulatory agency approves the 
price increase requested by the electric utility company. Even a smaller increase in residential 
electricity tariffs to 7.0 c€/kWh is likely to be extremely unpopular. It could also give rise to 
environmental externalities from an increased reliance on fuelwood, the main alternative 
household energy source, as households switch away from electricity. However, the cost of 
maintaining residential tariffs at the current price level in the face of the rising cost recovery 
price, as our analysis shows, would be prohibitively expensive. Maintaining tariffs below cost 
recovery levels would also undermine the government’s commitment to the development of a 
regional electricity market. To resolve this dilemma, the Government of Montenegro could 
evaluate a range of alternatives that combine the price increase with measures that would 
mitigate the effect of this dramatic price increase on poor and vulnerable households.  
 
In this paper, we use the 2004 ISSP
6 household survey data to provide an overview of energy 
consumption patterns in Montenegro and examine the likely impacts of electricity tariff 
reforms on household welfare. There are legitimate concerns that higher electricity tariffs will 
significantly increase the share of energy expenditures of poor households, particularly 
during the cold winter months. We also evaluate the distributional and fiscal impacts of 
alternative electricity tariff mechanisms using benefit incidence analysis. Our focus is 
primarily on the impact of different tariff levels and structures on the poor and vulnerable 
households.  
 
Throughout the welfare impact evaluation and benefit incidence analysis we assume that 
households do not switch to other heating fuels, but we relax this assumption in the analysis 
of household choice of a source of heating. Fuelwood is the main alternative to electricity for 
space heating and it is used by more than half of the population either as the only source of 
space heating or in conjunction with electricity. Higher electricity tariffs may result in 
increased demand for fuelwood, if an increase of electricity tariffs induces a significant 
number of households to switch to fuelwood for heating during the winter months. We 
investigate the potential impact of electricity tariff reforms on household heating fuel choice 
by estimating a fuel switching model. The switch to fuelwood for space heating could 
potentially have a negative impact on forest resources, particularly in the North, by inducing 
deforestation and on household health by increasing indoor air pollution. The evidence 
presented in this paper suggests that the impact of electricity tariff reforms on household 
choice of space heating fuels and the level of fuelwood consumption should be carefully 
monitored.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
reported in Alam, A., M. Murthi, R. Yemtsov, E. Murrugarra, N. Dudwick, E. Hamilton, and E. Tiogson (2005), 
“Growth Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” Washington, D.C., World 
Bank.  
6 Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognosis (www.isspm.org)   3
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Source: World Bank staff estimates, as reported in Alam et al (2005) 
 
 
2. Overview of energy consumption patterns in Montenegro 
 
How much do the poor spend on energy? In this overview of energy consumption patterns in 
Montenegro we focus on winter energy consumption, because space heating accounts for a 
substantial share of household energy consumption. Also, we want to be able to examine the 
trade offs between the two main sources of heating energy used during the winter months in 
Montenegro, which are electricity and fuelwood. Since energy consumption during the winter 
months is a necessity, it is not surprising that poor households spend a higher share of total 
expenditures on energy. Households in the poorest quintile spend more than twice as much 
(12.9% versus 5.2%) of their budget on energy expenditures than households in the highest 
quintile of the income distribution. Although many households do not heat their entire living 
space, energy consumption in Montenegro is very inefficient. Average energy consumption 
per square meter of living space in Montenegro is about 2.5 times greater than in Northern 
Europe, where the climate is more severe.
7 Higher electricity tariffs would encourage energy 
efficiency investments, however, the burden of higher electricity tariffs on the poor and their 
choice of heating fuel must also be considered. 
 
Poverty and the choice of space heating fuel. Households in Montenegro use primarily 
electricity and fuelwood for heating during the winter months. We find that more than half of 
the population (56.6%) uses fuelwood for heating.
8 Among the poor the dependence on 
fuelwood is even higher, with 86 percent of poor households relying to some extent on 
fuelwood for heating. The percentage of households using fuelwood is higher in rural areas 
(79.3%) and in the northern part of the country (71.1%), where the availability of fuelwood is 
greater and the climate is colder. A more detailed analysis follows, examining the pattern of 
                                                 
7 United Nations Development Program (2004), “Stuck in the Past: Energy, Environment and Poverty in Serbia 
and Montenegro.” 
8 Forty five percent of the population relies solely on fuelwood to meet their heating needs during the winter 
months.   4
energy consumption geographically, by income quintile groups, and across socioeconomic 
groups.  
 
Table 1 reports wood and electricity expenditures as a percentage of total household 
expenditures for households in different income groups and regions. The regional differences 
in household energy consumption patterns are striking. Fuelwood expenditures are 
considerably higher in the North (average of 4.9% of household expenditures) and for the 
households in the poorest quintile in the North and Central regions (over 5% of household 
expenditures). Fuelwood expenditures amount to approximately half of household total 
energy expenditures in all income groups in the North. In contrast, households in the South 
spend less than 1 percent of household expenditures on fuelwood. The share of fuelwood 
expenditures in total energy expenditures is 20 percent or less for households in the South.  
 
Electricity expenditure shares for the poorest quintile group in Montenegro are generally two 
to three times higher than the shares for the richest quintile group. A survey of household 
electricity expenditures in other eastern European and central Asian countries, shown in 
Figure 2, reveals a similar pattern of electricity expenditure shares between low and high 
income households. Given that electricity expenditures are a substantial component of the 
total budget of the poorest households, an increase in electricity tariffs will likely have a 
major impact on their welfare.  
 
 
Table 1.  Energy expenditures as a percentage of household total expenditures 
Wood Electricity  Total  energy 
Quintiles  North Center South North Center South North Center South ALL 
1  5.9 5.5 0.5  6.2 9.2 8.9 12.1 14.7  9.4 12.9 
2  5.3 3.9 1.1  4.2 6.0 6.8 9.5  9.9  7.9 9.5 
3  4.4 3.3 0.6  3.6 5.7 6.3 8.0  9.0  6.9 8.1 
4  3.9 2.1 0.4  3.9 4.6 5.4 7.8  6.7  5.8 6.9 
5  2.8 1.1 1.0  3.6 3.7 4.1 6.4  4.8  5.1 5.2 
ALL 4.9  3.8  0.7  4.7  5.6 6.0  9.6 6.0 9.6  8.8 
     Source: calculated from 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey. 
 
   5
 
Source: World Bank staff estimates, as reported in Alam et al (2005) 
 
 
For some households that use only electricity as a source of heating, the impact of higher 
electricity tariffs may be particularly severe. As shown in Table 2, the share of electricity 
expenditures in total household budget falls across all social and economic categories as 
income rises. In all but three instances, the share of electricity expenditures for households in 
the lowest income quintile group exceeds 10 percent of household expenditures. Particularly 
vulnerable are poor households with disabled persons and on family material assistance, with 
electricity expenditures reaching 13 percent of household expenditures, and households 
headed by an unemployed or retired person, which have electricity expenditures shares four 
times higher than similar household in the highest quintile group. Thus, at current prices 
electricity expenditures already exceed what is considered the benchmark affordability level 
of 10 percent of household expenditures.
9 The next section examines how higher electricity 
tariffs would affect household welfare and electricity expenditure shares, particularly the 
burden of higher electricity tariffs for the poor and vulnerable households.  
 
 
                                                 
9 See “Electricity Poverty and Energy Poverty,” IPA report (October 2003). 
Figure 2: Electricity Expenditure Shares of Poorest  




















































































































































































employed  Employed Retired 
1  11.2  11.4  11.0 11.2 11.7  11.9  10.1  11.4 
2  7.3 7.4  7.3  7.4  7.1 8.0 6.9  6.9 
3  6.9 5.4  6.5  6.7  6.7 3.0 6.3  7.1 
4  5.4 8.4  5.3  5.4  5.9 3.9 5.5  5.5 
5  4.2 4.5  3.2  4.3  4.3 3.1 4.3  3.8 
ALL 6.3 6.9  6.3  6.5  6.1 8.2 5.7  6.9 
Kids in the 
family  Disabled in family  Social 












in family  FMS  No 
FMS  Roma  Non 
Roma  House Apt 
1  9.3 11.6  10.8  13  12.9  9.8 6.9 11.3 9.9  11.8 
2  8.1  7.0 7.4  6.7 7.6  7.2  n/o  7.3 7  7.4 
3  8.7 6.3  6.4  9.5  8 6.5  5.5 6.7 6.8  6.6 
4  5.4 5.6  5.5  6.3  4 5.6  4.4 5.6 5.8  5.4 
5  4.4 4.2  4.2  3.7  n/o  4.2 n/o  4.2  4.5 3.9 
ALL  6.6  6.3 6.1  8.2 9.8  6.2  4.7 6.4 6.2  6.5 
   Source: calculated from 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey.   7
3. The impact of electricity tariff reform on household welfare 
 
In most scenarios of the proposed electricity tariff reforms that are currently under 
consideration the price of electricity would increase substantially. How hard will it be 
for households to adjust their consumption of electricity if they face higher electricity 
prices? Ideally we would want to have data on household consumption of electricity at 
different price levels to estimate the demand for electricity. Then we could derive the 
price elasticity of electricity demand, which would indicate how responsive electricity 
consumption would be to the proposed electricity tariff reforms. Unfortunately, data on 
Montenegrin household electricity consumption at different electricity price levels are 
not available in the ISSP 2004 survey or from previous household surveys. 
 
Estimating the welfare loss associated with higher electricity tariffs.
10 In the absence 
of electricity price variation to estimate a household demand function for electricity we 
calculate the welfare loss making different elasticity assumptions of household 
response to the proposed increase electricity price tariffs. The welfare loss is calculated 
as the loss in consumer surplus from the price increase, expressed as a percentage of 
total household expenditures. We assume three different electricity price elasticities. At 
one extreme, we assume that the price elasticity of electricity demand is zero and 
households do not change the quantity of electricity they consume when they face 
higher prices. This is our “worst case” scenario, in which household losses are the most 
significant. At the other extreme, we assume an elasticity of -1, which indicates that 
households’ response to electricity price changes is proportional to the magnitude of the 
price change. In this scenario, a 10 percent increase in electricity prices generates a 10 
percent reduction in electricity consumption. A more realistic case is an intermediate 
scenario, which assumes an elasticity of -0.5. In this scenario household demand is 
inelastic but it is responsive to higher electricity prices.  
 
Household welfare losses in different price elasticity scenarios. Table 3 presents the 
results of the analysis of welfare losses associated with higher electricity prices. The 
analysis suggests the welfare losses of the poorest quintile are approximately twice as 
large as the welfare losses of the richest quintile. The welfare losses for the poorest 
households are larger because the poor spend a higher share of expenditures on energy 
than the non-poor. Assuming the initial reforms result in an increase of the price of 
electricity to 7 c€/kWh, the welfare loss of the poorest households would range from 
2.66 to 3.41 percent of household expenditures. However, if households use only 
electricity for heating (and assuming they cannot switch to fuelwood), the welfare 
losses of the poorest households would range from 3.86 to 4.96 percent of household 
expenditures. The welfare losses are of course greater for higher electricity prices. The 
welfare losses assuming a zero elasticity are proportional to the price change, i.e. the 
welfare loss associated with a 50 percent increase in price would be twice as large as 
the welfare loss associated with a 25 percent increase in price. When demand is elastic, 
however, the rise in welfare losses is less than proportional to the price increase.
11 
                                                 
10 We follow the approach used by Caroline Freund and Christine Wallich (1997) in” Public-Sector Price 
Reforms in Transition Economies: Who Gains? Who Loses? The Case of Household Energy Prices in 
Poland.” Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
11 The welfare losses estimated assume households do not make investments to improve energy 
efficiency and are thus best interpreted as short term welfare losses. Clearly, higher electricity prices   8
 
Table 3.  Welfare losses associated with electricity tariff increases
1 
 
Electricity price increase to 7 c€/kWh 
 
All Households  Households using electricity 
only for heating  
 
Elasticity  0 -0.5 -1  0  -0.5  -1 
1 (Poorest)  3.41 3.04 2.66 4.96  4.41  3.86 
2  2.35 2.09 1.83 3.24  2.88  2.52 
3  2.31 2.05 1.79 2.97  2.64  2.31 
4  1.99 1.77 1.55 2.48  2.21  1.93 
5 (Richest)  1.68 1.50 1.31 1.86  1.66  1.45 
ALL  2.39 2.13 1.86 2.84  2.52  2.21 
Notes: 
1 Welfare losses expressed as a percentage of household expenditures. 
Calculations based on data from the 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey.  
 
 
Comparing the welfare losses of the poor across different socioeconomic groups. We 
are particularly interested in the welfare losses incurred by the poorest households. 
Table 4 presents the estimated welfare losses for households in the lowest income 
quintile, categorized according to different socioeconomic characteristics. We focus on 
households using only electricity for heating. In this scenario it is interesting to 
compare the current budget share spent on electricity and the welfare losses expressed 
as percentage of total household expenditures. The sum of the budget share of 
expenditures and the associated welfare loss when the price elasticity is zero represents 
the total electricity expenditures for the poor at the new electricity prices, assuming that 
households do not switch to other energy sources for heating. This is a reasonable 
approximation if we believe that the household demand function is fairly inelastic, 
since households are likely to be consuming the minimum amount of energy necessary 
to withstand the cold winter temperatures. If households are already at their minimum 
electricity consumption level and they have no possibility to switch to other heating 
fuels, then the impact of higher electricity prices on household budgets would indeed be 
severe. Some poor households, such as those with disabled household members or 
receiving family material assistance, are spending 13 percent of their budget on 
electricity. Assuming a zero price elasticity, they would be spending nearly 20 percent 
of their budget on electricity if prices increase to 7 c€/kWh.  
 
If we assume households do respond to higher electricity prices by reducing 
consumption of electricity, we cannot add the total welfare losses to the share of 
electricity expenditures to obtain the new share of electricity expenditures. This is 
because when the elasticity is not zero, the welfare losses include additional 
expenditures on electricity, as well as the consumer surplus loss incurred on the value 
of units not consumed at the higher price. Thus, when we calculate the welfare losses 
for an elasticity of -0.5, we present the consumer surplus loss and financial loss (or 
                                                                                                                                              
would induce households to invest in more energy efficient electrical appliances and better insulation in 
their homes in the long run. After such adjustments households would be able the same level of comfort 
using less energy.   9
additional expenditures) separately. As Table 4 shows, the consumer surplus loss 
outweighs the financial loss incurred as a result of higher electricity tariffs. The burden 
of higher electricity tariffs on household expenditures is lower when households reduce 
their consumption of electricity. Previous studies have estimated price elasticity of 
demand for heating to fall somewhere between -0.2 and -0.4, with poorer households 
being in the more inelastic range of these estimates.
12 Therefore our calculations of 
welfare losses for zero and -0.5 elasticity assumptions fall within the range of 
reasonable elasticity estimates.  
 
 
Table 4.  Welfare losses of poorest households in different socioeconomic groups
1  
 













Male  11.2 5.0 3.0  1.4  Gender of 
Household Head  Female  11.4 5.1 3.1  1.4 
No school or primary 
completed  11.0 4.9 3.0  1.4 
Some secondary 
school  11.2 5.0 3.0  1.4 
Education of 
Household Head 
Secondary +  11.7 5.2 3.2  1.4 
Unemployed  11.9 5.3 3.2  1.5 
Employed  10.1 4.5 2.7  1.2  Household head 
employment  Retired  11.4 5.1 3.1  1.4 
Kids up to 5  9.3 4.1  2.5  1.1  Kids in the 
family  No kids or older  11.6 5.1 3.1  1.4 
No disabled  10.8 4.8 2.9  1.3  Disabled in 
family  Disabled in family  13 5.8  3.5  1.6 
FMS  12.9 5.7 3.5  1.6  Social Assistance   No FMS  9.8 4.3  2.7  1.2 
House  9.9 4.4  2.7  1.4 
Dwelling  Apartment  11.8 5.2 3.2  1.4 
Notes: 
1  Welfare losses expressed as a percent of household expenditures and calculated assuming 




4. Comparison of social assistance options in the course of reforms 
 
Residential electricity consumption is not currently subsidized in Montenegro, since the 
average residential tariff of 4.85 c€/kWh, inclusive of the taxes, is approximately equal 
to the cost-recovery price. However, this situation will change in the future, and 
therefore the Government of Montenegro is seeking to design an effective social safety 
net program to mitigate the effect of a tariff increase on the poor. This section explores 
the advantages and disadvantages of alternative social assistance options in the course 
of reforms in the electricity sector in Montenegro.  
 
Provision of utility subsidies is a common way of mitigating the effect of electricity 
tariff increases on the poor, particularly wide-spread in developing and transition 
                                                 
12 Lampietti, J., A. Meyer (2002), “Coping with the Cold: Heating Strategies for Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia’s Urban Poor.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank.   10
countries. Electricity subsidies can be financed through a direct transfer of government 
funds or through a cross-subsidy between different groups of consumers. In this paper 
we refer to both types of transfer, whether from the government or from other 
consumers, as a subsidy. It is common to provide subsidies directly through the energy 
system by designing an Increasing Block Tariff (IBT), also called the “lifeline tariff,” 
or through a Volume Differentiated Tariff (VDT).
13 Another approach is to provide 
means-tested income transfers to qualifying households through a general social 
assistance program. “Social tariffs” combine the elements of these two approaches (see 
Table 5). For example, an IBT or other types of electricity discounts could be provided 
only to the qualifying customers, identified by administrative selection.  
 
 
Table 5.  Comparison of mitigation options of the effect of a tariff increase on the poor 




Increasing Block Tariff 
(IBT) (same as the 
“lifeline tariff”) 
A lower price is charged per kWh up 
to a pre-determined consumption 
threshold (lifeline limit). 
Consumption above the threshold 
limit is charged a higher price per 
kWh. All households consuming 
electricity benefit from the lower 
tariff below the threshold. 
Depends on the 
threshold. Error of 
exclusion of the poor 
is low if the threshold 
is high. 
Depends on the 
threshold. Error of 
inclusion of the 
non-poor is high if 




A lower price is charged per kWh up 
to a pre-determined consumption 
threshold only if monthly electricity 
consumption is below the threshold. 
If consumption is above the 
threshold, a higher price per kWh 
applies to all kWh consumed. Only 
households consuming less than the 
threshold level benefit from the 
subsidy. 
Depends on the 
threshold. Error of 
exclusion is likely 
higher than with a 
comparable IBT as 
many poor households 
may exceed the 
threshold level. 
Depends on the 
threshold. Error of 
inclusion is lower 
than with a 
comparable IBT. 
“Social tariffs”  IBT, VDT, or discounts provided to 
qualifying households, identified as 
poor. 
Means-tested social 
assistance transfers  
Qualifying households, identified as 
poor. 
If the social protection system is effective at 
identifying the poor, means-tested transfers 
or targeted “social tariffs” are superior to 
IBT and VDT in terms of coverage and 
targeting. 
Note: this table is based on the discussion in Komives et. al. (2005). 
 
 
Other approaches are burden limit, earmarked cash transfers, across-the-board subsidy 
and no disconnection policy. The burden limit approach means that the actual 
household utility expenditures are capped at a specified level, for example 10 percent of 
total household expenditures. An example earmarked cash transfers is the provision of 
cash transfers that can only be used for paying the utility bills. A subsidy could also be 
provided to all electricity consumers across-the-board when the tariff level is linear and 
it is set below the cost recovery level. Last, an implicit subsidy could be provided to 
consumers with poor payment discipline through a no disconnection policy.  In 
                                                 
13 Komives, K., V. Foster, J. Halpern, and Q. Wodon (2005), Water, Electricity, and the Poor. Who 
Benefits from Utility Subsidies? Washington, D.C.: World Bank.  11




Each approach has advantages and disadvantages according to a range of criteria. They 
are coverage, targeting, predictability of a subsidy, the pricing distortion it creates, 
administrative costs and the ease of implementation. As shown in Appendix Table 1, 
there no approach that is unequivocally preferable to all other ways of providing utility 
subsidies. Policy makers face a trade-off between the coverage and targeting 
performance of electricity subsidies. Coverage is measured by the share of subsidy 
recipients who are among the poor. A high percentage of beneficiaries among the poor 
indicates that a program is effective at reaching them. Coverage is high and the error of 
exclusion of the poor is low in this case. Targeting is measured by the share of the total 
subsidy going to the poor. A high share indicates that the resources are not leaking to 
the non-poor, and the error of inclusion of the non-poor among the recipients is low. As 
shown in Table 5, there is a trade-off between coverage and targeting. 
 
The administrative ease with which a particular tariff scheme could be implemented 
and predictability of a subsidy should be an important factor in the evaluation of a 
feasibility of implementing a particular tariff scheme. Non-linear pricing schemes could 
pose administrative challenges. Although Serbia has implemented an IBT system, the 
experience in other countries is mixed.  Often billing systems cannot handle it without 
major re-design. Meter readers may have to arrive on exactly the same day of the 
month at a given consumer, or there could be endless disputes about the monthly 
consumption vs. the thresholds.   Particularly in the case of VDT this can be a 
prohibitive issue and cause massive corruption.  
 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to designing an effective mitigation strategy in the 
course of energy pricing reforms. The general advice of the World Bank and the IMF is 
to use means-tested subsidies to soften the negative impact of rising utility tariffs on 
low income households, as this approach does not give rise to price distortions. 
However, administering a well-targeted means-tested program that delivers direct 
income transfers to the poor is fraught with implementation problems due to the 
difficulty in identifying eligible households, especially if households do not accurately 
report their income for taxation purposes.
15 Thus, implementation issues must be 
carefully evaluated in the design of a safety net system for the poor.  
 
The targeting and coverage performance of a subsidy depends on the pattern of 
electricity consumption by different income groups. A systematic review of electricity 
consumption subsidies in 22 countries reached a conclusion that an IBT, the most 
common tariff approach to providing subsidies, tends to have high coverage of the poor 
                                                 
14 According to EPCG, if old debts are excluded, the collection ratio varied between 62.4 and 89.4 
percent between 1999 and 2004, and in 2004 it varied between 69 and 100 percent by region. It is 
important to evaluate the relationship between tariff increases and arrears to see if high tariffs lead to 
deterioration in the payment discipline. Such data are not available in the survey data we use in this 
paper, so we are not able to investigate this relationship. 
15 For an in-depth discussion of the ways to design a successful means-tested direct income transfers 
program see Coady, Grosh and Hoddinot (2004). Targeting Transfers in Developing Countries. Review 
of Lessons and Experience. The World Bank. Washington, D.C.   12
but be poorly targeted. Modifying the block structure of an IBT can result in small 
improvements in terms of better targeting of the subsidy to the poor households. 
Introducing a VDT or well-targeted income transfers through the social protection 
system rather than the electricity sector can result in significant improvements.
16  
 
While it is usually true that an IBT does not result in well-targeted subsidies, in 
Montenegro electricity consumption is highly correlated with income. Households in 
the top decile of total per capita expenditures consume almost three times as much 
electricity as households in the bottom decile (Appendix Table 2). Although per capita 
consumption of electricity is almost constant with respect to income, the average 
household size is almost twice as large in the top as in the bottom decile. Figure 3 
clearly shows the strong correlation between total household electricity consumption 
and household size. As a consequence of this strong correlation, an IBT or a VDT will 




                          Source: Calculated from 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey.  
 
 
Benefit incidence analysis of alternative electricity tariff scenarios in Montenegro. In 
the remainder of this section we evaluate the distributional and fiscal impact of 
alternative electricity tariff reform scenarios by conducting benefit incidence analysis 
of in-kind electricity subsidies that households in Montenegro would receive in five 
policy scenarios. The analysis includes three steps. First, we calculate the subsidy per 
kWh as the difference between the cost-recovery price, assumed here to be 7 c€/kWh, 
and the electricity tariff households are charged. Second, we estimate the total annual 
subsidy received by each household as the average level of electricity consumption 
multiplied by the subsidy per unit. Third, we calculate the total subsidy received by the 
poor and non-poor households. Last, we compare the coverage and targeting 
                                                 
16 Komives et. al. (2005).  
Figure 3: Electricity consumption and
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performance of the simulated policy options and the financing requirements. The 
assumptions of the policy scenarios considered here are summarized in Table 6. They 
are not based on the actual reform proposals of the Government or the regulatory 
agency, as the Energy Law in Montenegro does not allow subsidizing electricity for 
particular groups of consumers using non-linear pricing.
17 We include these scenarios 
for illustrative purposes in order to show how well alternative pricing schemes would 
fare in Montenegro. 
 
 
Table 6.  Scenarios of electricity pricing policy reforms
1 









1   “Business as Usual Scenario” of 
no price increase while the cost-
recovery price rises 
4.85           32.6 
million 
Euro/year 
2  Increasing Block Tariff (IBT)    4.85  7.0  300  14.1 
million 
Euro/year 
3  Increasing Block Tariff (IBT)    4.85  8.6  300  None 
4  Volume Differentiated Tariff 
(VDT) 
   4.85  7.5  500  None 
5  A linear tariff increase to 
7c€/kWh combined with a 
Targeted income transfer of 10 
Euro/month to current FMS 
recipient households 






1 We assume that the current average tariff is 4.85 c€/kWh (including taxes), and it is equal to the 
cost-recovery tariff. The future cost-recovery tariff in these simulations is assumed to equal 7 c€/kWh. 
2 
In Scenarios 1 and 2 we calculated from the household survey data that this is the amount that would 
need to be financed either by the government or the energy company in scenarios where it is not covered 
by a cross-subsidy from high volume to low volume consumers. 
 
 
What is the fiscal cost of each policy option? In the “Business as Usual Scenario” 
(Scenario 1) we assume that the cost-recovery price rises to 7.0 c€/kWh, but the average 
electricity tariff remains at the current level of 4.85 c€/kWh. If this subsidy were funded by 
the government, the fiscal cost of the electricity subsidy to the household sector in this 
case would be approximately 32.6 million Euros per year. The size of the subsidy 
would be so large that it would be comparable to the entire social protection budget of 




In Scenario 2 all consumers pay 4.85 c€/kWh for the first 300 kWh they consume, and 
they pay the cost-recovery price (7.0 c€/kWh) for what they consume above this 
threshold. The fiscal cost of this subsidy would be 14.1 million Euros per year, since in 
this case only the first 300 kWh of electricity consumption is subsidized. If the 
                                                 
17 Personal comm. with the Ministry of Economy and EPCG (February 2006). 
18The budget of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is about 43 million Euros or about 3% of GDP, 
out of which about 90% or 38.7 million Euros is allocated to social benefits.  Budget deficit in MN in 
2004 was about 32 million Euro or 2.1% of GDP.  14
Government of Montenegro wished to establish a self financing mechanism instead, it 
would be necessary to raise the price on consumption above the 300 kWh threshold to 
8.6 c€/kWh, a very steep price increase (Scenario 3). High-volume consumers would thus 
cross-subsidize low-volume consumers in this scenario. It may or may not be politically 
feasible to implement such a significant price increase. In Scenario 4 we show that a 
VDT with a higher threshold of 500 kWh and a lower tariff on consumption above the 
threshold than in Scenario 3 would also be fiscally neutral and could be a viable 
alternative to the IBT. 
 
How large is the subsidy and what share of it goes to the poor? The size of the 
subsidy varies by scenario. In Scenario 1 high volume consumers, who are also the 
highest income consumers, receive the largest monthly subsidy (Figure 4 and Appendix 
Table 3). In Scenario 2 the subsidy is only for the first 300 kWh, and it is the same for 
all income groups since on average all households consume more than 300 kWh per 
month. Interestingly, in Scenario 2 the share of the total subsidy going to the poorest 
households is much higher than the share going to the highest income deciles. In this 
scenario, households in the bottom two deciles receive 27 percent of the total subsidy, 
while households in the top two deciles receive 17 percent (Appendix Table 4). Even 
though the subsidy per household is the same in absolute terms, there are twice as many 
households in the bottom decile than in the top decile, because poor households are half 
as large as the richest ones. Since the deciles are based on population and the poor 
households are small, the bottom decile has more households than the other deciles. 
Thus, it is important to look not only at the share of the total subsidy going to the 
poorest households, which is the commonly used targeting indicator, but also at the 
absolute level of the subsidy per household while evaluating the welfare impact of 
alternative tariff structures in Montenegro. 
 
The average subsidies per household in Scenarios 3 and 4 are similar. As shown in 
Figure 4, they are in the range of 2 to 4 Euros for households in the bottom three 
deciles, while high income households pay a higher average tariff than the cost-
recovery level on their total electricity consumption (Appendix Table 2).  In these 
scenarios high income households cross-subsidize the poor, and both of these scenarios 
are fiscally neutral. Scenario 3 has the disadvantage of a very high tariff on electricity 
consumption above the 300 kWh threshold, but it has broad coverage, with 100 percent 
of the poor receiving the subsidy. Scenario 4 has a lower tariff on electricity 
consumption above the 500 kWh threshold and a slightly higher average subsidy to the 





Source: calculated from 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey. 
 
 
What share of the poor receives a subsidy? The five alternative subsidy programs we 
have considered in this analysis are very different in terms of coverage performance. 
Clearly, all households are subsidy recipients in Scenario 1 when everybody is charged 
a tariff below the cost-recovery level (Table 7). In Scenario 2 the price of the first block 
is below the cost-recovery level, and at the cost-recovery level for the second block. In 
this case all consumers are subsidy beneficiaries. In Scenario 3 all consumers receive a 
subsidy for the first 300 kWh; however, high volume consumers pay a higher price than 
the cost-recovery level for consumption in excess of 300 kWh. Since non-poor 
households are high volume consumers, our calculations show that overall they would 
be cross-subsidizing the poor. This result is unique to the countries like Montenegro, 
where higher income households consume significantly more electricity than low 
income households, making it relatively easy to implement quantity-based targeting 
with an IBT structure.
19 However, it is necessary to have a very large difference 
between the price for consumption below and above the threshold, and it may not 
necessarily be politically feasible.    
 
A VDT in Scenario 4 would require a smaller difference between the lower and upper 
consumption blocks in order to remain fiscally neutral. However, this tariff scheme 
would perform worse in terms of coverage. As shown in Table 7, only two thirds of the 
poorest households would receive any subsidy. The remaining 26 percent of 
households in the bottom decile consume more than 500 kWh and they would pay for 
their consumption at the higher rate, assuming that they do not adjust their consumption 
level in response to the change in tariff policy. 
 
                                                 
19 It is common for electricity consumption to increase with income, but, as shown in Komives et. al. 
(2005), it is less common to see such a high discrepancy in the consumption level of the connected poor 
and the non-poor. 
Figure 4: Average monthly electricity subsidy 
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Targeted transfers in Scenario 5, which assumes that current FMS recipients qualify for 
an increased transfer to offset higher electricity tariffs, would reach a low share of the 
poor. The Government of Montenegro would need to develop a well-targeted and 
broad-based program of social assistance if benefit provision through direct income 
transfers were to be the chosen mitigation option. However, this would be an expensive 
program and the Government does not currently planning to re-design the social 
protection system in order to broaden the recipient base and improve benefit targeting. 
 
 
Table 7. Subsidy recipients (in percent of total households in the income category) 
   deciles of total per capita household expenditures    
    1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  Total 
Scenario  1  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 
Scenario  2    100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 
Scenario  3  100  100 100 100 100  -  -  -  -  -  57 
Scenario  4  74  54 47 32 31  -  -  -  -  -  29 
Scenario  5  22 19  10  11  6 9  10  16  7 4 12 
Total number of 
households (‘000)  29  25  17  18  18  18  16  16  15  16  187 
Source: calculated from 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey. 
 
 
Limitations of benefit incidence analysis. In this section we have conducted a static 
analysis, assuming that households do not adjust their consumption of electricity to the 
price increase. In reality, some households will adjust by reducing their electricity 
consumption and switching away from electricity to fuelwood.  To the extent that the 
poor switch at a higher rate than the non-poor, the distribution of the beneficiaries of a 
subsidy can change in the policy scenarios examined. This is especially true for the 
VDT scenario. The poorest households whose consumption is close to the 500 kWh 
threshold are likely to reduce their consumption below the limit so that they would 
qualify for the lower tariff, especially if some mechanism is in place to prevent them 
from accidentally exceeding the limit and switching to the higher tariff. 
 
The benefit incidence analysis in this section is informative for comparing the efficacy 
of alternative tariff structures at reaching the poor in the process of electricity tariff 
reforms. However, it is also important to recognize the limitations of this approach. The 
distribution of a subsidy does not imply anything about the distribution of the welfare 
impact of different programs. For example, poor households with low consumption of 
electricity may have a higher valuation of each additional unit of consumption and it 
may be more difficult for them to substitute away from electricity than it is for 
households with a high consumption volume. By the same token, households with no 
access to substitute fuels or facing technical constraints in switching fuels would also 
incur higher welfare losses from an electricity tariff increase than households with easy 
access to substitute fuels. Furthermore, switching to fuelwood gives rise to externalities 
from an increased rate of deforestation. Benefit incidence analysis is not intended to 
address any of these issues. This type of analysis is useful for comparing the 
distribution of the subsidy via different mechanisms, but not to determine the socially 
optimal level of a subsidy.  
  17
5. The potential impact of energy price reform on household fuel choice 
 
The analysis of electricity price reforms so far has assumed that household choice of 
heating fuel does not change. However, evidence from other countries in the region 
suggests electricity tariff reforms can have a significant impact on household fuel 
choice. For example, in Armenia, more than 60 percent of households reported 
increasing use of fuelwood as a substitute when the price of electricity increased by 
about 50 percent.
20 The magnitude of proposed electricity price reforms in Montenegro 
therefore warrants at careful look at the potential impact of higher electricity prices on 
fuel substitution. 
 
Approach to estimating household fuel choice.
21 We estimate a multinomial logit 
model to investigate what factors determine household choice of a heating fuel. Since 
most households in Montenegro use electricity or fuelwood for heating, we specify a 
multinomial logit model with three choices: use only electricity for heating, use only 
fuelwood for heating, and use a mix of both electricity and fuelwood for heating.
22 
Other types of heating fuel, such as gas, fuel oil, and diesel, are rather rare in 
Montenegro. A small percentage of households in the North use coal for heating as 
well, generally in conjunction with electricity and/or fuelwood. However, since the 
number of households using coal for heating amount to less than 5 percent of the 
sample, we do not include coal as a heating fuel choice in the analysis. We model 
household choice of heating fuel as a function of prices, income, household social and 
economic characteristics, housing characteristics, and location where the household 
lives.  
 
Prices are clearly an important determinant of household heating fuel choice. Although 
the price of electricity does not vary across households, the price of fuelwood varies 
considerably across the country. Since the price of electricity does not vary, we cannot 
directly estimate its impact on heating fuel choice. We therefore examine the impact of 
the price of fuelwood relative to the price electricity.
23 Household per capita 
expenditures are used instead of income, due to a large number of missing observations 
on reported income. The importance of income/expenditures in household fuel choice is 
well documented.
24 As income rises, household consumption of biomass fuels 
decreases and the uptake of modern fuels increases. However, one may be concerned 
that the inclusion of income and household characteristics which may partly determine 
                                                 
20 Lampietti, Julian, Anthony Kolb, Sumila Gulyani, and Vahram Avenesyan (2001). Utility Pricing and 
the Poor: Lessons from Armenia. World Bank Technical Paper No. 497. 
21 The model used here follows Rasmus Heltberg’s analysis in Fuel Switching: Evidence from Eight 
Developing Countries. Energy Economics (2004).  
22 During the winter, households use fuelwood for heating as well as for cooking. This is simply because 
they typically have only one cooker in the house, mainly in the living and dining rooms (very often, 
those two rooms are connected). 
23 We define the relative price as the ratio of the price of fuel wood to the price of electricity. The price 
of fuel wood is converted into kWh units, using the standard energy conversion factor of 2,610 kWh in 
one cubic meter of fuel wood. This assumes moisture content is one third of weight. The efficiency of 
using fuel wood is clearly determined by the type of wood stove used and the effective energy content of 
one cubic meter of fuel wood will be different for households using different types of wood stoves.  
24 See Barnes, D.F., Krutilla, K., Hyde, W. (2004), The Urban Energy Transition? Energy, Poverty, and 
the Environment.   18
income levels may lead to bias estimates. We therefore compare the results of the 
model estimated with and without the household per capita expenditures variable. We 
find that the inclusion of household per capita expenditures does not significantly affect 
any of the other explanatory variables coefficients, and report the results including per 
capita expenditures as one of the explanatory variables (as do most other energy 
studies).  
 
Household fuel choices are influenced by the household’s social and economic 
characteristics. When households produce or collect the fuelwood they use, their use 
and collection is influenced by the opportunity costs and productivity of household 
members’ labor. Thus, households that own their wood plot would be more likely to 
use fuelwood, as would larger households, particular those with unemployed or 
underemployed members. Households with higher education, on the other hand, would 
be less likely to use fuelwood. We include in the model the following household 
characteristics: household size, the number of children under 5 years of age, education 
level of household head, gender of household head, employment status of household 
head, whether the household owns a wood plot, whether the household receives family 
material assistance, and whether the household belongs to the Roma population. 
 
Housing characteristics are clearly important and may determine to what extent 
household are able to choose fuelwood as an alternative. Households living in 
apartments rather than houses may be more constrained in their choice of heating fuel. 
Newer housing, particularly apartments, may not be fitted with proper ventilation to 
allow burning of wood indoors. Finally, if the dwelling is renter occupied, it is less 
likely that the tenant would invest in modifications to allow use of fuelwood as an 
alternative. We thus include in the analysis housing characteristics such as: dwelling 
type (house or apartment), whether the household owns the dwelling, age of the 
dwelling, and the size of the living area. Regional dummies are used to control for 
climate differences and other unaccounted regional differences.  
 
Main results of the household fuel choice model. The results of the multinomial logit 
model are reported in Table 8. We select households that use only electricity as the base 
case scenario and report the variables which affect full or partial use of fuelwood for 
space heating. Price and income are significant determinants of a using only fuelwood, 
but not of a partial use of fuelwood. Higher relative prices decrease the probability of 
using only fuelwood for space heating. This means as electricity prices increase, the 
relative price of fuelwood falls and therefore the probability of using only fuelwood for 
space heating increases. Richer households are less likely to use only fuelwood for 
heating.  
 
Household living in a house are significantly more likely to use fuelwood for space 
heating, as are households living in the North. Household head education and gender 
also affect fuel choice. More educated household heads are less likely to use only 
fuelwood, whereas households headed by females are more likely to use only fuelwood 
for space heating. Larger household are also more likely to use fuelwood than smaller 
households. Ownership of a wood plot also significantly increases the probability of 
using fuelwood for space heating. Thus household characteristics matter a great deal in 
the choice of heating fuel. Larger household size, which could indicate the availability  19
of free household labor to chop and transport fuelwood, and ownership of a wood plot, 
may make fuelwood an even cheaper alternative heating fuel. Female headed 
households and households headed by a less educated individual are more likely to use 
fuelwood, even when household income is controlled for.   
 
 
Table 8. Multinomial Logit Regression Results
1 
Log likelihood = -494.84  Pseudo R
2 = 0.377 
LR chi
2(36)  =599.03    
Prob > chi
2 = 0.000  Number of observations = 840 
   
Fuel Choice
2 
  Fuelwood only  Fuelwood and electricity 
 
Variables   Coefficients  Std. Error  Coefficients  Std. Error 
  Relative price (Pwood/Pelectricity) -1.671***  0.434 -0.514  0.505 
  Per capita expenditures   -0.007***  0.002 -0.001  0.002 
  Household size  0.206** 0.103  0.389*** 0.120 
  No. children under 5  -0.008  0.221  -0.093  0.274 
  Household head education  -0.117*** 0.031  -0.067* 0.036 
  Female household head  0.616** 0.310  0.386 0.389 
  Household head unemployed  0.087  0.333  -0.832  0.445 
  Household head retired  0.252  0.283  0.174  0.318 
 Family  receives  material 
assistance 0.001  0.346  0.454  0.441 
  Roma 1.130  0.735  -0.495  1.311 
  Live in a house  2.465*** 0.283  2.136*** 0.330 
  Own house  0.186  0.319  0.164  0.425 
  Age of house  -0.002  0.004  0.005  0.003 
  Living space (m
2)
  0.000 0.004 0.005  0.004 
  Household owns wood plot  1.237** 0.542  0.096 0.656 
  North region  3.431*** 0.425  1.842*** 0.466 
  Central region  1.338*** 0.340  0.494  0.358 
  Constant 2.506  1.192  -2.651  1.408 
1The analysis focuses on choice of heating fuel, not fuel for all energy consumption. Heating constitutes the 
most significant share of winter energy expenditures.  
2Electricity only is the base outcome for comparison.  
 
 
How many households does the model predict will switch to fuel wood? Our main 
interest here is to predict the number of household that may switch to fuelwood as a 
result of electricity price increases. The multinomial regression coefficients do not 
directly provide such information, but we can use the model to calculate the change in 
predicted probability of each outcome. Table 9 shows the predicted changes in the 
proportion of households using electricity only, fuelwood only, or using both electricity 
and fuelwood., assuming an increase in electricity prices to 7c€/kWh. To assess the 
predictive accuracy of the model we first compare the actual proportion of household 
using each fuel observed in the data with the multinomial logit model’s prediction. As 
the first two columns of Table 9 show, the estimated model predicts the proportion of 
households using each alternative remarkably well.   20
 
We use the estimated regression coefficients to predict the change in probability of 
each outcome when households face higher electricity prices. This is done holding all 
other household characteristics constant and allowing only the relative price of 
electricity to vary. We then recalculate the predicted probability of each outcome using 
the higher electricity prices. The third column of Table 9 shows the predicted impact of 
higher electricity prices on household fuel choice. Overall, the model predicts the 
proportion of households using only electricity for heating will fall by 9 percentage 
points and proportion of households using fuelwood only will increase by 11 
percentage points. This would result in just over a quarter of the population using 
electricity only for heating, compared to the baseline of more than a third of the overall 
population using electricity only. The proportion of households using fuelwood only 
would increase to nearly two thirds of the population. Household dependence on 
fuelwood resources, either solely or in conjunction with electricity, would increase to a 
nearly three quarters of the population. This could represent a substantial increase in the 
quantity of fuelwood consumed and potentially a reason for concern.  
 
Interestingly, the impact of higher electricity prices affects household fuel choice across 
all income groups. The proportional impact on the poorest households is largest, and 
thus we still observe the proportion of households using electricity for heating 
increasing across income groups and the proportion of households using fuelwood 
decreasing across income groups. We find that the proportion of households using both 
electricity and fuelwood would decrease as result of higher electricity prices. This 
happens because some households using both electricity and fuelwood switch to using 
fuelwood only for heating. While the proportion of households using both fuels falls in 
all income groups, households in the poorest quintile see the largest drop in the use of 
both fuels. Households using both electricity and fuelwood would of course adjust the 
amount of each fuel consumed and potentially increase the quantity of fuelwood used, 
but these trade offs on the quantity of each fuel consumed cannot be captured by the 
model estimated.  
 
As a caveat, we must note that the model estimated likely over predicts the likelihood 
of households switching to fuelwood for space heating. This is partly because the 
model does not account for the capital costs incurred in switching from electricity to 
fuelwood. Our model can only consider the cost per unit of energy consumed using the 
relative price ratio. Although we use several housing characteristic controls, in some 
housing units the option of switching to fuelwood may not be at possible for technical 
reasons. Since we do not have data about the feasibility of switching to fuelwood, our 
model may over predict the extent switching to fuelwood occurs. Finally, we refrain 
from estimating the potential impact of further electricity price increases, since prices 
higher than 7 c€/kWh would fall far outside the relative price range that we observe in 







Table 9.  Household fuel choice and electricity prices 
 
Actual fuel choice 
proportions observed 
 
Estimates of fuel choice by 
multinomial logit model 
 
Predicted fuel choice with 





















1  11  75 14  12  78 10    7  87   6 
2  22 68  10 20 67  13 12 78  10 
3  33 58   9 31 58  11 23 68   8 
4  41 43  16 38 46  16 29 58  13 
5  60 24  16 59 26  15 49 37  14 




6. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
In this note we analyze the impact of higher electricity tariffs on household welfare, the 
distributional and fiscal impact of alternative electricity tariff structures, and the 
potential impact of higher electricity tariffs on household choice of space heating fuel. 
We pay particular attention to the welfare losses of higher electricity tariffs on poor 
households and the distributional implications of alternative electricity tariff structures.  
 
Our analysis suggests that the proposed electricity tariff reforms could have a very 
significant impact on the welfare of poor households. We find that households in the 
poorest quintile spend, on average, twice the share of richest households’ expenditures 
on energy. The burden of electricity expenditures on households in the poorest quintile 
amounts to 10 percent of household expenditures for those relying only on electricity 
for heating. As such, the impact of higher electricity prices would affect poor 
household’s welfare considerably. If we assume that poor households do not switch 
heating fuel and have fairly inelastic demand for electricity, they would experience 
welfare losses in the range of 3 to 5 percent of household expenditures due to proposed 
electricity tariff increases to 7 c€/kWh. These impacts, however, depend on the extent 
households adjust their consumption of electricity as a result of the higher tariffs and 
the type of tariff structure which is adopted.  
 
More than half of the population relies on fuelwood for space heating. Higher 
electricity prices could significantly increase the proportion of households using 
fuelwood for space heating to nearly two thirds of the population. A higher proportion 
of the poor already rely on fuelwood for space heating and more would be expected to 
switch to fuelwood as result of higher electricity tariffs. Additional demand for 
fuelwood as a result of higher electricity prices therefore could have negative impacts 
on fuelwood availability, with increase demand potentially leading to higher fuelwood 
prices and an even greater energy affordability problem for poor households. How 
electricity price reforms affect household choice of space heating fuel and fuelwood 
demand should be carefully monitored. This underscores the importance of keeping in  22
mind the possible unintended consequences of the electricity reforms for the 
environment as well as for poverty. 
 
The Government of Montenegro will need to seriously consider the design of a safety 
net to protect the vulnerable households and the environment from the full brunt of the 
adverse effects of the anticipated pricing reform. Keeping residential electricity prices 
at their current level will not be a feasible policy option when the cost-recovery price 
begins to rise because of the very high fiscal costs of such a policy. Even without 
recourse to public funds in Montenegro, there is significant scope for mitigating the 
adverse effect of an electricity tariff increase on the poor households. The poor in 
Montenegro consume half as much electricity as the non-poor households, making it 
possible to effectively deliver cross-subsidies to the poor by quantity-based targeting 
with non-linear pricing schemes. 
 
As we have shown, non-linear tariff schemes may be preferable on the basis of their 
targeting and coverage performance compared to linear tariff schemes, although their 
implementation may be complicated. In theory, an IBT or a VDT tariff could result in a 
much higher share of the total subsidy accruing to the poor than with a linear scheme, 
and with an IBT all the poor would be covered by the subsidy. In practice, the 
Government of Montenegro would need to consider the implementation issues if a non-
linear scheme were under consideration. The legal issues pose a further obstacle to the 
introduction of a non-linear pricing scheme as the Energy Law in Montenegro 
stipulates that cross-subsidies to any groups of consumers must be phased out. The 
Government of Montenegro could evaluate the possibility of revising the Energy Law, 
if it is convinced that the implementation issues will not pose a serious obstacle to 
introducing non-linear pricing schemes. 
 
Provision of social assistance through the general social protection program may be 
feasible in the long term if a broad-based and well-targeted social protection program is 
in place in the future. However, finding the sources of financing for such a program 
will be problematic and the Government of Montenegro does not currently plan to 
increase social spending on the scale that would be needed to mitigate the energy 
reform’s welfare impacts. This means that the government, the regulatory agency and 
the electric utility company must find innovative ways to finance a social assistance 
program for the poor and at the same time enhance energy efficiency in the residential 
sector. For example, the stakeholders in the reform process might evaluate the 
feasibility of using a portion of the taxes on electricity to create a fund that will finance 
projects that will enhance energy efficiency for residential consumers or they might 




































              
Coverage  1  1 to 2  1 to 2  1  1  1  1 
Targeting 1  0  0  1  0  2  2 
Predictability 0  2  2  2  1  1  1 
Pricing 
Distortions 
-2 -2  -1  -1  -1  -1 0 
Administration 
Cost/Difficulty 
0 0  0  -1  -2 -2  -2 
Aggregate 
Score 
2  2 to 4  3 to 5  4  0  4  5 
Note: Scoring: 0 - low, 1 - medium, 2 - high. Aggregate score was calculated using double weights for the 
first two criteria.  





Table 2. Monthly total average annual household electricity consumption (kWh/month) 
   deciles of per capita total expenditures    
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Total 
North  368 435 507 522 500 641 634 796 865  1151  572 
Center  427 576 540 676 706 652 750 754 723  953  654 
South  425 519 546 689 630 751 805 690 816  1203  711 
Total  401 515 528 625 626 694 730 755 789  1076  642 
Source: calculated from 2004 ISSP Montenegro Household Survey by dividing monthly reported electricity 
expenditures by the average electricity tariff of 4.85 Eurocents/kWh. 
 
 
Table 3. Average subsidy (positive) and tax (negative) received or paid by households 
(Euro/month) 
   deciles of total per capita household expenditures    
    1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  Total 
Scenario  1  8.8  11.3 12.1 14.1 13.3 15.7 15.3 18.3 17.7 25.5  14.5 
Scenario  2  5.8  6.2 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4  6.3 
Scenario  3  3.5  2.4 1.9 0.5 0.8 -0.7  -0.4  -2.6  -2.1 -8  0 
Scenario  4  4.0  2.8 2.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6  -1.5  -2.6  -3.1  -5.0  0 
Scenario  5  2.2  1.9 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.6 0.7 0.4  1.2 
 
 
Table 4. Total subsidy (tax) received or paid by households by income category (million Euro/year) 
   deciles of total per capita household expenditures    
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  Total 
Total subsidy (tax), million Euro per year         
Scenario  1  3.1 3.3 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.3 2.9 3.6 3.2 4.8  32.6 
Scenario  2  2.0 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2  14.1 
Scenario  3  1.2 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.1  -0.1  -0.5  -0.4  -1.5  0 
Scenario  4  1.4 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3  -0.3  -0.5  -0.6  -0.9  0 
Scenario  5  0.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 2.8 
Percent of total subsidy           
Scenario  1  9 10 8  9  9 10 9 11  10  15  100 
Scenario  2  14 13  9  10 10 10  9  9  8  9 100 
Scenario  5 1  20  8 8 4 7 7  12  5 2  100 
  
 
 